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Speech on May 26th 2004 in the
Lords on the principles and conduct of UK foreign policy , with special
reference to the Iraq crisis and trans-atlantic relations.
The Rise of ‘Soft Power’
Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I begin by declaring some interests: as a
parent of a son serving in the Army in Basra; as a financial adviser to the
Kuwait Investment Office; and as a Conservative Friend of Israel. I hope that
those labels do not disqualify me from offering some reasonable, balanced views
on the dangerous issues that have been debated so fully today.
I, too, warmly thank the noble Lord, Lord Wright of Richmond, for promoting the
debate and introducing it with such enormous wisdom and elegance. Of course, we
expect that from him, given his record and his past. I also thoroughly enjoyed
the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, former Secretary-General
of NATO. I am sorry that under our rules his speech was so truncated because I
could have stood a lot more from him. And I hope that we get a lot more in due
course because he spoke much wisdom.
I want to begin with some brief, general observations about the conduct of
foreign policy before turning to the specifics. First, in pursuit of our
priority objectives—safeguarding our national security and interests, however
broadly we interpret them—some of us have argued for two decades that we should
think more in terms of soft power. Translated, that means meeting today's
threats,
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hostile stances and sources of destructive tension not just by hard military
strength and force—what the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, called heavy metal
armies—but by the powerful projection of our cause, case and desire for
friendship through the persuasive instruments of diplomacy, information,
well-honed development policies, cultural activities, skilful activity within
international organisations and the ample use of semi-official and
non-governmental linkages, as well as the private sector.
That is what the authors of the Foreign Office document, UK International
Priorities, really meant when they talked about a "new agenda" in foreign policy
and wider participants in international relations. They did not use the term
"soft power", but that is what was behind some of the writing in the document.
It would be difficult to think of a more obvious situation calling for the
maximum deployment of soft power than the current efforts to defeat global
terrorism and change hearts, minds and attitudes, and even styles of governance,
throughout the whole Middle East region.
"Soft power" means that yesterday's Cinderella organisations like the BBC World
Service or the British Council—to which the noble Lord, Lord Wright, referred—or
educational, medical and environmental development programmes become not the
after-thoughts and leftovers but the front edge of the campaign to secure
friends and win hearts and minds. And so do organisations like the Commonwealth,
which has not had much of a mention in the debate. Many of us feel that far from
it being an organisation of the past, it is a superb but underfunded global
network of the future.
That is why the events of recent weeks—the Abu Ghraib torture and abuse stories
to which several noble Lords referred—are so utterly disastrous. They are the
equivalent in modern terms of a major military defeat. It is why carrier fleets,
strike fighters, high-tech missiles and the classic instrument of hard power are
only half our defences and protection and can deliver only half our foreign
policy. There is the other pillar, which is becoming more significant. The noble
Lord, Lord Biffen, with great wisdom, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord
Bramall, rightly emphasised that point.
Speaking of soft power leads me to my second general point, which is that, in
these conditions, no country can go it alone—not mighty but very vulnerable
America; not some cobbled-up European superpower designed as a counter-weight of
some form; no nation; and no armed force. The fact is that, thanks to
technology, we now live in a totally networked structure in which all the old
ways of looking at the world in terms of permanent blocks, hegemonies and
hyper-powers are becoming utterly meaningless.
I think that that, above all, is why even those of us who are the United States'
strongest admirers—I am one of them—find the Washington evangelical rhetoric
about America being the greatest power on earth and the world's only superpower,
bristling with missions and visions and so on, so worrying, unconvincing,
ephemeral and, frankly, counter-productive, as some of your Lordships have
rightly said.
26 May 2004 : Column 1378
At such a time as this, people may talk, understandably, about distancing
ourselves from America. But what we really need—I think that the noble Lord,
Lord Wallace, made this point—is to be more closely involved than ever with the
American debate in order to drive home the new reality about the network nature
and fluidity of the international order. We need to drive home the imperative
need for the Americans to work closely and co-operatively with their many
potential allies and willing friends and to use their own "soft power", if you
like, rather than rely on the doctrines of overwhelming force and the big stick
alone. That would not work.
In that context—this is my third general observation—we seem to be faced too
often in these debates with two polar ideas. Either we are told that Middle East
states must all succumb to the imposed Washington Jeffersonian or Westminster
democratic model—my noble friends Lord Biffen and Lord Eden rightly questioned
that simplicity—or the opposite: that the Islamic theocracies are "inevitable",
that they cannot be stopped and that Islam and democracy are somehow
incompatible and we may as well face that fact. Both those polar views are
equally silly and equally dangerous.
I often wonder whether any of the many experts now telling us that the coalition
should hand over power to the Iraqi ayatollahs have any idea what that would do
to the stability of the entire Middle East. The wise and gradualist reformers in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Bahrain, who—if anyone looks at what they are trying to
do—are all seeking to pluralize their governance, would all have the rug pulled
from under them if Iraq turned into an extreme Islamic state. The outcome would
not be stability and it certainly would not be representative democracy; it
would be the rise of street revolution and of new intolerant
cliques—anti-Western, anti-freedom, anti-women, anti-peace and anti-almost any
form of civilised human advance.
In the immediate situation in Iraq, the key question, which has been touched on
in this debate, is of course how sovereignty is to be handed over and whether
the latest UN resolution, which we understand has now been tabled, does the
trick. My own view is that, in fairness, it is certainly more than cosmetic, as
some critics are all too ready to call it. But obviously the success of the
resolution and the next stage of policy depend on some crucial problems and
questions, and I hope that the Minister will be able to touch on some of them.
The first is: can Mr Brahimi really perform magic and, in the next few days,
come up with the right names which will command confidence in Iraq? Will the new
Iraqi Government have the veto on all or any coalition or so-called
"multilateral force" operations, as the Prime Minister seems to want? Having
said that, nowadays it is extremely hard to find out what government policy
is—it changes so fast—other than receiving it second-hand through journalists.
And what will be the status of our troops?
Is the British contribution to be strengthened? Half the newspapers say that it
is and others say that it is not official yet. I gather that plans are already
under way
26 May 2004 : Column 1379
to move British contingents northwards from Basra so that the whole southern
half of Iraq becomes a British military zone. When will we be told about that
rather than have to pick up the occasional rumour? More broadly, can the
coalition slip out of its occupying power jacket and don the garb of a more
pro-Iraqi aid to the civil power? Will there be a national Security Council-type
mechanism in the Iraqi government in Baghdad to allow that?
The answers to those questions are not in the draft resolution, which is silent
on most of those matters. On the other hand, those who say that the whole
operation should be not only UN-approved, as I hope it will be, but under full
UN control are, I believe, deluding themselves. The UN does not have the
capacity, the will, the track record or, at present, the reputation—certainly in
Iraq—to do what the Iraqis must do for themselves. I believe it was Dag
Hammarskjo ld who, long ago, said that the UN is set up not to take mankind to
paradise but to save it from hell. I think that that is the kind of fairly
modest level of aim which we should entertain in thinking about the UN.
We now urgently need from the Government a firm and clear view based on a
robust, open and frank debate about the way ahead in Iraq, as well as in the
wider Middle East and on the dubious Sharon plan, which I do not have time to
comment on, and on where we think coalition policy could be improved by both
soft and hard-power deployments judiciously mixed together.
I have no criticism of the Prime Minister for making Britain's views on all this
clear, whether or not they differ from those in Washington. Indeed, I believe
that he should have done so earlier. I see nothing wrong with that; nothing
inconsistent with our fervent wish to see this whole project succeed; and
nothing wrong with the Opposition wanting this debating process out in the open,
as the Liberal Democrats do as well. I hope that the Prime Minister will set out
that strategic picture when he speaks at the UN and the G8. I hope that he will
base it, coming from a parliamentary democracy as he does, on ideas and
viewpoints that have been properly tested here in parliamentary debate and
discussion. I totally agree with the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, that our
committee system in both Houses, and certainly in this House, could do a lot
better in that respect.
We have to get the priorities right in our democracy. We cannot afford to spread
our resources and energies over everything in a kind of vague haze of good
intentions and good will. We cannot make everything a priority as, reading the
Foreign Office paper, I sometimes feel some Foreign Office planners want to do.
Now, as never before, we must identify in a hard-headed way, and well ahead of
time, the real threats to us and to our people from tomorrow's world and
identify from which direction they are coming, whether far or near. We will not
be forgiven for failing to do that.
26 May 2004 : Column 1380
6.18 p.m.
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord
Wright of Richmond, for introducing this debate and for doing it with his
customary authority and command of the subject. His was a lucid and powerful
overview of the overall foreign policy priorities from the position of a former
diplomat, former ambassador, Permanent Secretary and, significantly, accounting
officer.
Our debate has been graced by many distinguished contributions, but none more so
than from my noble friend Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. The whole House owes my
noble friend a debt of gratitude for his outstanding service as NATO's
Secretary-General. It was a privilege to serve with him as a defence Minister;
it was also a great deal of fun, as your Lordships will have been able to deduce
from my noble friend's contribution. And it was a privilege to represent the
United Kingdom at the last NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting, which he chaired
last December
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