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30th August 2005
Article for the Japan Times. Published Sept 9th 2005
By David Howell
Go Gently in Lebanon
BEIRUT – The tragic assassination of Rafik Hariri, both former and prospective
Lebanon Prime Minister, on St Valentine’s Day (February 14th) set in motion a
chain of events which gave the world hope about Lebanon’s future.
Statesmen everywhere applauded the response of the Lebanese people. President
Bush spoke enthusiastically about the Cedar Revolution, the United Nations
passed resolutions, the Syrians, after a bit of grumbling, withdrew, at least
militarily, and there was optimism on all sides that the Lebanese ‘model’ of
communities coming together, of Muslim and Christian solidarity and of democracy
actually operating, would give a lift to the whole Middle-East reform process
and set in motion the ‘domino’ influence of stability which every country,
especially the big oil importers like Japan, wants to see in the region.
Yet today, despite these high hopes, Lebanon remains in a deeply uneasy and
delicate state. The whole country is nervous and the fledgling new government is
nervous. The final report from the German judge Detliv Mehlis and his 100-strong
team of investigators, into the Hariri killing, and the individuals who may have
been behind it , not due now until the end of October (although an interim or
holding statement has just appeared) is awaited with strong apprehension, like
‘the Sword of Damocles hanging over us’, as President Lahoud put it to me.
Rumours abound of more violence and more divisions to come. Grim thoughts about
sliding back into the civil war that convulsed the country two decades ago are
not far away.
This is not at all the time for extra outside pressures, however well meant. UN
Resolution 1559 calls not just for Syrian withdrawal, which has happened, but
for the disarming of all militias and resistance groups within Lebanon. What
this really means is that Hizbollah, by far the largest and most active group,
virtually a state within the state, should disband its armed organisation,
leaving the Lebanese army as the proper and legal commanding force in looking
after Lebanon’s security.
After all, say the policy-makers in Washington and elsewhere, what could be more
equitable than that? Is that not just what the British sought to do with the IRA
in Northern Ireland – to abandon completely the bullet for the ballot -
(incidentally they have not yet finally succeeded) and isn’t it an axiom of
democratic politics that all participants must accept the sole authority of the
state in matters of national security and law and order enforcement, that there
can be no state within the state?
From a distance all this sounds eminently reasonable, especially if, as is the
case, one of the Ministers in the new Government, is a Hizbollah man. But the
comparison with Northern Ireland is not really valid. To a far greater extent
than occurred in the IRA case, Hizbollah’s position remains the product of
external influences and forces which connect up with almost every aspect of
Middle-East scene - with the Israel-Palestine issue , with Iran’s baleful
shadow, with the shifting sands of Syria’s politics, and now with the awful
prospect of a ‘federal’ Iraq leading to a disintegrating state, the very
opposite of what the Lebanese are struggling to achieve in their small patch.
Outside experts, sitting comfortably in Washington ,New York, London, Brussels
or Tokyo, may concliude the new Lebanese Government is being feeble in not
complying instantly with UN Resolutions and insisting here and now on Hizbollah
disarmament. But inside Lebanon this is a seen as a recipe for a rapid return to
civil war, of the sort which reduced Lebanon from being the glittering
Switzerland of the Middle East to the near ruin from which it is only just
recovering .
It cannot be done instantly, or by force, only gradually and with the most
profound and sensitive internal political management, which the undoubtedly able
new Government team might just manage, as long as its elbow is not jogged.
Hizbollah today is a widespread social and community force. Whatever its shadowy
connections with Teheran’s ayatollahs, and its sources of funds, it is still
seen by many as a necessary protection against Israeli threats and land disputes
in the south and against erosion of a fair place and say for the big Shiite
Muslim minority in modern Lebanon.
The cure for these divisions will come not from turning the heat on the new
Government in Beirut but from addressing more successfully than so far the huge
external issues of which the internal Lebanese scene - and the very reason for
Hizbollah’s existence and power - is just one outcome. Little but beautiful
Lebanon’s problems are the result, not the cause, of all these surrounding
tensions, rivalries and hatreds.
The agenda for tackling these wider Middle East ‘sores’ is miserably familiar
and easy to recite, although far less easy to progress – get the roadmap to an
independent Palestine truly under way (the Gaza withdrawal is just a start);
cool the prickly Iranians down without too many lectures and threats; show the
Syrians where their true interests and future prosperity lie; somehow get the
Sunnis on board in Iraq (and keep the Kurds on board) before the place breaks
up.
Juts a few small tasks? Of course not. These things will keep the whole
international community bogged down for years to come. But wrecking Lebanese
democracy ( a rare enough thing in the Middle East) in the meantime, by pressing
for instant solutions there, is pointless. The Lebanese ‘model’ can still be
made to work, even if nothing else does in this benighted region. But it needs
to be given time and space to do so.
ENDS
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